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CRIMINAL LAW

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: CRIMINAL LAW PANEL
CYNTHIA V. WARD*

INTRODUCTION
The topic of Law and Morality is a capacious one, and the essays
on this Panel approach it from different corners of a very large tent.
In The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between
Deontologicaland EmpiricalDesert, Paul Robinson wonders not so
much about the role of morality, but about the role of moral
philosophy,in resolving some of the long-contested issues that beset
the law of crime. Acknowledging the importance of desert as a
justification for criminal punishment, Professor Robinson envisions
a competition between two subconceptions: deontological desert,
according to which blameworthiness is assessed by reference to
acontextual principles of right and good; and empirical desert, which
grounds judgments about blameworthiness in the actual intuitions
of citizens, as collected and evaluated using the methods of social
science.' Robinson argues that contemporary moral philosophy
focuses heavily on the investigation and analysis of existing moral
intuitions, and that this focus, although useful in some ways,
threatens to inhibit or destroy the important deontological role that
moral philosophy should play in the criminal arena.2 That role, he
* Professor of Law, College of William & Mary.
1. Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between
Deontologicaland EmpiricalDesert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1832-33 (2007).
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argues, is to provide a "transcendent check" on our existing intuitions about justice to ensure that those intuitions are not wrong
according to the acontextual principles of right and wrong that
deontological conceptions of desert take as central.3
Professor Robinson's thesis invites a host of interesting questions, only a few of which can even be named in this brief introductory essay. Is there really a strong and analytically defensible
distinction between deontological and empirical desert? If so, are
these two subconcepts really in "competition" with each other in a
way that should matter to the enterprise of moral philosophy? As
either an analytical or an empirical matter, how should one
distinguish between a "transcendent" principle of right and wrong
and a principle that becomes the basis for philosophical interrogation because it reflects a widely shared and empirically verifiable
intuition about justice? Are the two varieties of principle innately
different in kind; in origin; in application; in result? If so, at what
conceptual levels; and must the criminal law take note of them at
those levels?
In his essay The Jurisprudenceof Punishment, Kyron Huigens
wonders about the relationship between punishment theories
-theories that justify the infliction of criminal punishment-and
theories of legality, which attempt to identify and describe the bases
for valid legal rules. In Robinsonian terms, Professor Huigens
begins in the manner of the contemporary moral philosopher-by
naming what he takes to be the widely shared intuition that certain
theories of punishment "match" with certain theories of legal
validity.4 Specifically he wants to test out, and ultimately challenge,
the belief that virtue-based punishment theories "belong" to, or
"match" with, natural law theory.5 In fact, Huigens argues, punishment theory and jurisprudence do not match up in this way.
Instead, Huigens makes the provocative, if somewhat enigmatical,
claim that punishment theory is "orthogonal to" theories of legality.6
Although making moral desert the basis for legal desert in a theory
3. Id. at 1841.
4. Kyron Huigens, The Jurisprudenceof Punishment,48 WM. &MARY L. REV. 1793,179394 (2007).
5. Id. at 1795.
6. Id.
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of punishment is not incorrect, Huigens argues that it is also
possible to construct a purely legal theory of desert, one that is not
innately moral in character and that may nonetheless form the
basis for an Aristotelian, virtue-based theory of punishment.7

7. See id. at 1822-28.

